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Abstract
We formulate a generalized price-setting framework that incorporates staggered contracts of
multiple durations and that enables us to directly identify the influences of nominal vs. real
rigidities. Using German macroeconomic data over the period 1975Q1 through 1998Q4 to
estimate this framework, we find that the data is well-characterized by a truncated Calvo-
style distribution with an average duration of about two quarters. We also find that new
contracts exhibit very low sensitivity to marginal cost, corresponding to a relatively high
degree of real rigidity. Finally, our results indicate that backward-looking behavior is not
needed to explain the aggregate data, at least in an environment with a stable monetary
policy regime and a transparent and credible inflation objective.
Keywords: overlapping contracts, nominal rigidity, real rigidity, inflation persistence,
simulation-based indirect inference
JEL classification: E31, E52Non-Technical Summary
In this paper, we formulate a generalized price-setting framework that incorporates
staggered price contracts of multiple durations and that enables us to directly identify
the inﬂuences of nominal versus real rigidities. In analyzing price contracts with random
duration, we assume that every ﬁrm which resets its price faces the same ex ante probability
distribution of contract duration, as in Calvo (1983), but we do not impose any restrictions
on the shape of the hazard function. This framework also enables us to consider speciﬁca-
tions in which each ﬁrm signs price contracts with a ﬁxed and known duration, as in Taylor
(1980), but this duration is permitted to vary across diﬀerent groups of ﬁrms. Finally, our
price-setting framework encompasses two sources of real rigidity: ﬁrm-speciﬁc factor inputs,
and non-constant elasticity of demand.
Our empirical analysis utilizes German macroeconomic data over the period 1975Q1
through 1998Q4–a dataset that provides a virtually ideal setting for determining the struc-
tural characteristics of price-setting behavior in the context of a stable monetary policy
regime. In particular, the Bundesbank maintained a transparent and, one may presume,
reasonably credible medium-term inﬂation objective that declined gradually from 5 percent
in 1975 to 2 percent in 1984, and remained essentially constant thereafter. Thus, our in-
vestigation proceeds by ﬁtting the deviations of actual inﬂation from the downward trend
in the Bundesbank’s medium-term inﬂation objective.
Using simulation-based indirect inference methods to estimate the model, we ﬁnd that
price-setting behavior is well-characterized by staggered contracts with an average dura-
tion of about two quarters. Furthermore, the results are reasonably similar regardless of
whether we assume that contracts have random or ﬁxed duration. We also ﬁnd that new
price contracts exhibit very low sensitivity to marginal cost, corresponding to a relatively
high degree of real rigidity involving both ﬁrm-speciﬁc inputs and strong curvature of the
demand function. Finally, we conﬁrm that the estimated model is not rejected by tests
of overidentifying restrictions, and that the implied autocorrelations are virtually indistin-
guishable from those of an unrestricted vector autoregression. Evidently, backward-looking
behavior (due to informational constraints or rule-of-thumb price-setting) is not needed to
explain the aggregate data, at least in the context of a stable policy regime with a trans-
parent and credible inﬂation objective.
Our empirical ﬁndings regarding the frequency of price adjustments are broadly consis-
tent with recent evidence from ﬁrm-level surveys and micro price records. This evidence also
provides some indirect support for our focus on time-dependent rather than state-dependent
speciﬁcations of price-setting behavior.
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Micro-founded models of price-setting behavior are essential for understanding aggregate
inﬂation dynamics and for evaluating the performance of alternative monetary policy
regimes.1 Both nominal and real rigidities play a crucial role in determining the partic-
ular implications of these models; thus, a large body of empirical research has been oriented
towards gauging the frequency of price adjustment, the sensitivity of price revisions to
demand and cost pressures, and the prevalence of indexation or rules of thumb.2
The recent empirical literature has mainly focused on estimating variants of the New
Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC), which can be derived under the assumption that price
contracts have random duration with a constant hazard rate.3 Nevertheless, since the slope
of the NKPC depends on the mean duration of price contracts as well as potential sources of
real rigidity, the underlying structural parameters cannot be separately identiﬁed using this
framework.4 Furthermore, while most studies have obtained highly signiﬁcant estimates of
the coeﬃcient on lagged inﬂation, no consensus has been reached about whether to interpret
these results as reﬂecting backward-looking price-setting behavior or gradual learning about
occasional shifts in the monetary policy regime.5
In this paper, we formulate a generalized price-setting framework that incorporates stag-
gered contracts of multiple durations and that enables us to directly identify the inﬂuences
of nominal vs. real rigidities. In analyzing contracts with random duration, we assume
that every ﬁrm which resets its price faces the same ex ante probability distribution of
contract duration, as in Calvo (1983), but we do not impose any restrictions on the shape
of the hazard function. This framework also enables us to consider speciﬁcations in which
each ﬁrm signs price contracts with a ﬁxed and known duration, as in Taylor (1980), but
1See Rotemberg (1996), Yun (1996), Goodfriend and King (1997), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997),
Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (1999), and Woodford (2003).
2The importance of combining nominal and real rigidities has been emphasized by Ball and Romer (1990),
Chari, Kehoe, and McGratten (2000), and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2004).
3Following Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone (2002), the literature has become too voluminous to be
enumerated here; recent examples include Lind´ e (2001), Neiss and Nelson (2002), Sondergaard (2003), and
Cogley and Sbordone (2004).
4See Gal´ ı, Gertler, and L´ opez-Salido (2001) and Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004).
5For example, Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) consider a speciﬁcation with rule-of-thumb price-setters, while
Erceg and Levin (2003) show that the lagged inﬂation term in the hybrid Phillips curve can be generated
by rational agents who use signal extraction to learn about shifts in the central bank’s inﬂation objective.
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encompasses two sources of real rigidity: ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors, and non-constant elasticity
of demand.
Our empirical analysis utilizes German macroeconomic data over the period 1975Q1
through 1998Q4–a dataset that provides a virtually ideal setting for determining the struc-
tural characteristics of price-setting behavior in the context of a stable monetary policy
regime. In particular, the Bundesbank maintained a transparent and, one may presume,
reasonably credible medium-term inﬂation objective that declined gradually from 5 per-
cent in 1975 to 2 percent in 1984, and remained essentially constant thereafter. Thus, our
investigation proceeds by ﬁtting the deviations of actual inﬂation from the Bundesbank’s
medium-term inﬂation objective.
Using simulation-based indirect inference methods to estimate the model, we ﬁnd that
price-setting behavior is well-characterized by staggered contracts with an average dura-
tion of about two quarters. Furthermore, the results are reasonably similar regardless of
whether we assume that contracts have random or ﬁxed duration. We also ﬁnd that new
price contracts exhibit very low sensitivity to marginal cost, corresponding to a relatively
high degree of real rigidity involving both ﬁrm-speciﬁc inputs and strong curvature of the
demand function. Finally, we conﬁrm that the estimated model is not rejected by tests
of overidentifying restrictions, and that the implied autocorrelations are virtually indistin-
guishable from those of an unrestricted vector autoregression.6 Evidently, backward-looking
behavior (due to informational constraints or rule-of-thumb price-setting) is not needed to
explain the aggregate data, at least in the context of a stable policy regime with a trans-
parent and credible inﬂation objective.
Our empirical ﬁndings regarding the frequency of price adjustments are broadly consis-
tent with recent evidence from ﬁrm-level surveys and micro price records.7 The microeco-
6Mash (2003) uses micro evidence to calibrate a similar price-setting framework with a generalized hazard
function, and shows that the calibrated model can roughly match empirical autocorrelations.
7Survey evidence has been obtained by Blinder, Canetti, Lebow, and Rudd (1998), Hall, Walsh, and
Yates (2000), Apel, Friberg, and Hallsten (2001), and Fabiani, Gattulli, and Sabbatini (2004). For recent
evidence from micro price records, see Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2003), Golosov and Lucas (2003),
Aucremanne and Dhyne (2004), Bils and Klenow (2004), and Dias, Dias, and Neves (2004). Additional
references and discussion may be found in Taylor (1999).
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than state-dependent speciﬁcations of price-setting behavior.8
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the generalized
price-setting framework. Section 3 describes the data used in our analysis, while Section 4
reviews the estimation methodology. Section 5 reports the estimated distribution of contract
durations and conﬁrms that these results are reasonably robust to alternative proxies for
real marginal cost; this section also conﬁrms the goodness-of-ﬁt of the model and documents
the importance of accounting for the evolution of the Bundesbank’s medium-term inﬂation
objective. Section 6 reports the estimated degree of real rigidity, interprets these results in
terms of the underlying structural parameters, and assesses the potential downward bias
due to persistent mismeasurement of real marginal cost. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Generalized Price-Setting Framework
In this section we formulate a generalized price-setting framework that incorporates stag-
gered nominal contracts of multiple durations. Within this framework, we allow price
contracts to have either random duration ` a la Calvo (1983) or ﬁxed duration ` a la Taylor
(1980). In the former case, we assume that every ﬁrm which resets its price faces the same
ex ante probability distribution of contract duration, without imposing any restrictions on
the shape of the hazard function. In the latter case, every price contract has a ﬁxed and
known duration which varies across diﬀerent groups of ﬁrms.
Our framework encompasses two sources of real rigidity. First, following Kimball (1995),
each ﬁrm’s demand may exhibit a high degree of curvature (approximating a “kinked de-
mand curve”) as a function of the ﬁrm’s price deviation from the average price level.9 Thus,
when a ﬁrm is resetting its price contract, its optimal price will be relatively less sensitive
to changes in the ﬁrm’s marginal cost. Second, the presence of ﬁxed ﬁrm-speciﬁc inputs
causes each ﬁrm’s marginal cost to vary with its level of output and hence dampens the
8Caplin and Leahy (1997) and Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999) have developed models of state-
dependent price-setting, while Klenow and Kryvstov (2004) provide recent evidence on its limited role
in generating aggregate inﬂation variability; see also recent work by Dotsey and King (2004).
9See also Woglom (1982) and Ball and Romer (1990).
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hike in response to a particular shock, the ﬁrm recognizes that lower demand will reduce
its marginal cost, thereby partially oﬀsetting the original rationale for raising its price.
Henceforth we will use the term “capital” to refer to the ﬁxed factor in production, while
the variable factor will be referred to as “labor.” Nevertheless, it should be emphasized
that the ﬁxed factor could include land as well as any overhead labor that cannot easily
be adjusted in the short run. Furthermore, while our analysis abstracts from the inﬂuence
of endogenous capital accumulation, the results of Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) indicate
that the degree of real rigidity is quantitatively similar for speciﬁcations with ﬁxed capital
and for speciﬁcations with an empirically reasonable magnitude of adjustment costs for
investment.10
2.1 The Market Structure
Consider a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms indexed by f ∈ [0,1], each of
which produces a diﬀerentiated good Yt(f) using the following production function:
Yt(f)=At ¯ K(f)αLt(f)1−α. (1)
Note that all ﬁrms have the same level of total factor productivity, At. To ensure symmetry
in the deterministic steady state, we also assume that every ﬁrm owns an identical capital
stock, ¯ K(f)= ¯ K.
A distinct set of perfectly competitive aggregators combine all of the diﬀerentiated
products into a single ﬁnal good, Yt, using the following technology:
  1
0
G(Yt(f)/Yt)df =1 , (2)
where the function G(·) is increasing and strictly concave with G(1) = 1. Under this
deﬁnition, the steady state of aggregate output, ¯ Y , is identical to the steady-state output
of each individual ﬁrm, ¯ Y (f).
10Optimal price setting with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital accumulation has recently been analyzed by Sveen and
Weinke (2003), Christiano (2004), and Woodford (2004); see also Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Lind´ e
(2004) and de Walque, Smets, and Wouters (2004).
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η = −G (1)/G  (1) > 1. Furthermore, we use   to denote the relative slope of the demand
elasticity around its steady-state value; that is,   = ηG    (1)/G  (1)+η+1. Thus, the special
case   = 0 corresponds to the Dixit-Stiglitz speciﬁcation of constant demand elasticity, for
which G(x)=xη/(η−1).
Under these assumptions, each ﬁrm f faces the following implicit demand curve for its





   1
0
(Yt(z)/Yt)G (Yt(z)/Yt)dz. (3)
The concavity of G(·) ensures that the demand curve is downward-sloping; that is,
dYt(f)/dPt(f) < 0. The price index Pt can be obtained explicitly by multiplying both





Finally, the ﬁrm’s real marginal cost function MCt(f) is given as follows:
MCt(f)=
Wt
(1 − α)PtAt ¯ K(f)αLt(f)−α, (5)
where Wt denotes the nominal wage rate.
2.2 The Duration of Price Contracts
We assume that the prices for the diﬀerentiated goods, Pt(f), are determined by staggered
nominal price contracts with a maximum duration of J periods. For j =1 ,...,J, let ωj
denote the fraction of price contracts that have a duration of j periods, where ωj ≥ 0 and
 J
j=1 ωj =1.
In the case of random contract durations, every ﬁrm has the same hazard function, which
determines the probability that the ﬁrm is permitted to reset its price. The speciﬁcation
here generalizes that of Calvo (1983), because the probability of a price revision can depend
on the number of periods that the existing contract has been in eﬀect. Speciﬁcally, a ﬁrm
f whose contract has been in eﬀect for k periods faces the probability
 k
j=1 ωj of receiving
permission to reset its contract in the current period, where, as noted above, ωj ≥ 0 and
10
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j=1 ωj = 1. With probability
 J
j=k+1 ωj, this ﬁrm is not permitted to reset its contract
in period t, and its price remains unchanged; that is, Pt(f)=Pt−1(f).
In the case of ﬁxed contract durations, ωj denotes the fraction of ﬁrms that sign price
contracts with a duration of j periods (j =1 ,...,J), where again ωj ≥ 0 and
 J
j=1 ωj =1.
For each contract length j, an equi-proportionate fraction ωj/j of ﬁrms reset their contracts
in any given period t. For each ﬁrm which does not reset its contract in period t, its price
remains unchanged, that is Pt(f)=Pt−1(f).
In formal terms, the distribution of ﬁxed-duration contracts can be represented as fol-
lows. Let {Ω1,...,ΩJ } denote a partition of the continuum of monopolistically competitive
ﬁrms Ω = [0,1] into subintervals with Ω j =[sj−1,s j )f o rj =1 ,...,J− 1together with
ΩJ =[sJ−1,s J ], satisfying 0 = s0 ≤ s1 ≤···<s J = 1; and let ωj = µ(Ωj) denote the mea-
sure of the subinterval Ωj. The individual ﬁrms in Ωj may be indexed so that every ﬁrm with
index f ∈ [sj−1,s j−1+(sj−sj−1)/j ) resets its contract price whenever the period t is evenly
divisible by j; similarly ﬁrms with index f ∈ [sj−1 +( sj − sj−1)/j,sj−1 +2 ( sj − sj−1)/j )
reset prices during periods in which modulus(t,j) = 1, and so forth.
2.3 The Optimal Price-Setting Decision
In period t, each ﬁrm resetting its contract chooses its new price Pt(f) to maximise the
ﬁrm’s expected discounted proﬁts over the life of the contract,
Et
  J−1  
i=0
χi λt,t+i (Pt(f)Yt+i(f) − Wt+iLt+i(f))
 
, (6)
subject to the production function (1) and the implicit demand curve (3), where the stochas-
tic discount factor λt,t+i can be obtained from the consumption Euler equation of the rep-
resentative household.
If the price contract has random duration, then the coeﬃcient χi indicates the probabil-
ity that the price contract will still be in eﬀect after i periods; that is, χi =
 J
k=i+1 ωk for
i =0 ,...,J−1. In the special case of Calvo-style contracts, the ﬁrm faces a constant prob-
ability ξ of not revising its contract in any given period; thus, χi = ξi, and the maximum
duration J →∞ .
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function. In particular, when the contract has a duration of j periods (for j =1 ,...,J),
then χi =1f o ri =0 ,...,j− 1and 0 otherwise.
2.4 The Log-Linearization with Random Contract Duration
We now proceed to log-linearize the pricing equation and the aggregate price identity around
the deterministic steady state with zero inﬂation.11 We use πt to denote the aggregate
inﬂation rate, while mct denotes the average real marginal cost across all ﬁrms in the
economy (expressed as a logarithmic deviation from its steady-state value), and yt denotes
the logarithmic deviation of aggregate output from steady state.
In the case of random contract durations, all ﬁrms signing new contracts at date t set the
same price. Thus, using xt to denote the logarithmic deviation of the new contract price
from the aggregate price level, we obtain the following expression for the log-linearized
optimal price-setting equation:
xt =E t
  J−1  
i=1

















The coeﬃcient γ in equation (7) determines the sensitivity of new price contracts to
aggregate real marginal cost. In particular, as shown by Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004),











It should be noted that the coeﬃcient γd depends solely on the relative curvature of the
ﬁrm’s demand function, and has a value of unity in the special case with constant demand
11For analysis of the log-linearization around a non-zero steady state, see Ascari (2003) for the case
of random-duration contracts, and Erceg and Levin (2003) for the case of ﬁxed-duration contracts. The
same ﬁrst-order approximation is obtained under the assumption that all price contracts are indexed to the
(possibly non-zero) steady-state inﬂation rate.
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ﬁrm’s relative price inﬂuences its marginal cost, and has a value of unity in the special case
with no ﬁxed factors; that is, γmc = 1when α =0 .


















2.5 The Log-Linearization with Fixed Contract Duration
For the case of ﬁxed-duration contracts, let xj,t indicate the logarithmic deviation of the
new contract price of duration j from the aggregate price level. Then the log-linearized












where ˜ φj,i = βi/
 j−1
k=0 βk and ˜ Φj,i =
 j−1
k=i φj,k. The aggregate price level depends on all
















The empirical results reported below for ﬁxed-duration contracts are based on analysis
of equations (11) and (12). In addition, for purposes of comparison with some of the earlier
literature on ﬁxed-duration contracts, Appendix B provides results using the simplifying
assumption of negligible variation across new price contracts.
3 The Data
In estimating a structural price-setting framework, it is essential to avoid spurious inﬂuences
due to shifts in the monetary policy regime. In cases where the shift is not transparent or
credible, price-setting behavior may appear to be backward-looking when in fact private
13
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2003). Even a transparent and credible change in the central bank’s inﬂation objective
tends to raise the measured degree of inﬂation persistence unless the shift is explicitly taken
into account in the estimation procedure (cf. Levin and Piger 2004).
Thus, German macroeconomic data for 1975-1998 provides a virtually ideal setting for
determining the structural characteristics of price-setting, because the Bundesbank main-
tained a reasonably transparent and credible medium-term inﬂation objective over this
period. In particular, in the process of deriving money growth targets (starting in 1975),
the Bundesbank regularly stated its assumptions regarding the level of inﬂation over the
medium run, set in the broader context of the ultimate goal of price stability. During the
late 1970s and early 1980s, the medium-term assumption was referred to as the “unavoid-
able” level of inﬂation, reﬂecting the Bundesbank’s willingness to attain price stability over
a longer horizon rather than inducing a sudden sharp contraction in real economic activ-
ity.12 After reaching the neighborhood of price stability in the mid-1980s, the Bundesbank
referred to its inﬂation assumption as the “medium-term price norm”.13
The upper-left panel of Figure 1 depicts the evolution of actual inﬂation and the
Bundesbank’s medium-term inﬂation objective over the period 1974-1998. At the beginning
of the sample period, GDP price inﬂation was at a transitory peak of about 8 percent
in the wake of the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime and the ﬁrst OPEC oil price
shock. Inﬂation subsequently stabilized around the Bundesbank’s medium-term inﬂation
objective of about 5 percent, and then declined fairly gradually through the late 1970s
and early 1980s, roughly in parallel with reductions in the Bundesbank’s medium-term
objective. From about 1985 through the advent of the European Monetary Union, the
inﬂation objective remained essentially constant at 2 percent; actual inﬂation exhibited an
average level fairly close to this objective, with only one large deviation in the early 1990s
during the process of German uniﬁcation. Our empirical investigation proceeds by ﬁtting
12As shown by Erceg and Levin (2003), even a transparent and credible disinﬂation causes a transitory
recession in a model with four-quarter Taylor-style wage and price contracts. In contrast, disinﬂations can
be costless in models with Calvo-style contracts.
13Further details regarding the Bundesbank’s monetary policy strategy may be found in Schmid (1999)
and Gerberding, Seitz, and Worms (2004).
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November 2004Figure 1: German Inﬂation and Markup Gaps, 1974-1998
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Note: Inﬂation is measured as the annualized quarter-on-quarter change in the logarithm of the GDP price
deﬂator. The inﬂation gap is deﬁned as the deviation of inﬂation from the Bundesbank’s medium-term
inﬂation objective. The labor share is constructed as the ratio of total compensation (including imputed
labor income of self-employed workers) to nominal GDP. The markup gap is deﬁned as the deviation of
the logarithm of the labor share from a linear trend.
the deviations of actual inﬂation from the Bundesbank’s medium-term inﬂation objective;
this “inﬂation gap” is shown in the upper-right panel of Figure 1.
The labor share serves as our benchmark proxy for real marginal cost. In measuring the
labor share, it is important to account for the signiﬁcant role of self-employed workers in the
German economy. In the absence of direct measures of labor compensation for self-employed
workers, we follow the fairly standard approach of computing the labor share by taking the
compensation of employees (which does not include self-employed workers), multiplying this
15
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employees, and then dividing by nominal GDP. In eﬀect, this procedure uses the average
compensation rate of employees to impute the labor compensation of self-employed workers.
The lower-left panel of Figure 1depicts the evolution of the German labor share. This
series exhibits a clear downward trend over the sample period, presumably reﬂecting gradual
structural changes in the German economy. Since our analytical framework follows the
standard New Keynesian view that prices adjust in response to deviations of the actual
markup from a desired level, we interpret the low-frequency movement of the labor share as
a deterministic trend in the desired markup. Thus, our price-setting framework is estimated
using the detrended labor share–henceforth referred to as the markup gap–as depicted in
the lower-right panel of Figure 1.
In performing sensitivity analysis, we consider several alternative proxies for real
marginal cost, each of which is depicted in Figure 2. The upper-right panel shows two
measures of the output gap, which have been constructed from real GDP (shown in the
upper-left panel) using linear detrending and Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltering, respectively. The
lower-left panel depicts the ratio of employee compensation to nominal GDP. This measure–
henceforth referred to as the uncorrected labor share–implicitly attributes all of the income
of self-employed workers as compensation to capital rather than labor. The behavior of the
detrended series (shown in the lower-right panel) is broadly similar to that of the benchmark
series, but the deviation from trend is much larger in the mid-1970s; given that this devia-
tion is not accompanied by substantial movement in inﬂation, we shall see below that the
uncorrected labor share implies an even higher degree of real rigidity than the benchmark
series.
4 Estimation Methodology
Our empirical analysis essentially follows the approach of Coenen and Wieland (2004). In
the ﬁrst stage, we estimate an unconstrained VAR model that provides an empirical de-
scription of the dynamics of the inﬂation gap, the markup gap, and the output gap. In
16
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November 2004Figure 2: Alternative Proxies for the Markup Gap
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Note: Output is measured as the logarithm of real GDP. The output gap is constructed by detrending
output using either a linear trend or a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter of 10,000. The
uncorrected labor share is the ratio of employee compensation to nominal GDP, and does not incorporate
the imputed labor income of self-employed workers. The corresponding markup gap is obtained by linearly
detrending the logarithm of the uncorrected labor share.
the second stage, we employ simulation-based indirect inference methods to estimate the
structural price-setting equations, using the unconstrained VAR as the auxiliary model.
In eﬀect, this method determines the parameters of the structural model by matching its
reduced form–which constitutes a constrained VAR–as closely as possible with the uncon-
strained VAR.14
14The method of indirect inference was proposed by Smith (1993) and Gouri´ eroux, Monfort and Renault
(1993); see also Gouri´ eroux and Monfort (1996). For a summary of the asymptotic properties of this
procedure, see the appendix of the working paper version of Coenen and Wieland (2004).
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that have been employed in the literature, and then describe the estimation methodology
in further detail.
4.1 Comparison with Alternative Approaches
Unlike most of the literature on estimating NKPCs, standard method-of-moments proce-
dures cannot be applied to our generalized price-setting framework due to the presence of
unobserved variables (namely, the new contracts signed each period). Furthermore, since
each contract price depends on expected future markup gaps, we need to specify how these
gaps are determined. To avoid imposing any additional restrictions, we simply take the
markup gap and output gap equations from the unconstrained VAR and combine these
with the structural price-setting equations; we refer to the combined set of equations as the
“structural model” even though only part of the model is truly structural.15
Our estimation methodology has some appealing features compared with several other
commonly-employed procedures. For example, one alternative approach is to specify a
complete structural model and estimate its parameters by matching some of the implied
impulse response functions (IRFs) to those of an identiﬁed VAR model.16 In contrast, our
procedure matches the implications of the structural model to those of an unconstrained
VAR, thereby avoiding the need to impose potentially controversial identifying assumptions
on the auxiliary model. Furthermore, our procedure essentially matches all of the sample
autocorrelations and cross-correlations rather than a limited set of characteristics of the
data.
Another alternative approach involves the use of full-information methods to estimate a
complete structural model.17 Nevertheless, one potential pitfall of that approach is that the
price-setting parameter estimates could be sensitive to misspeciﬁcations in other aspects of
the model–a particularly important issue in this case due to the lack of consensus about
15This limited-information approach follows Taylor (1993) and Fuhrer and Moore (1995), and is similar
in spirit to the approach of Sbordone (2002).
16Recent examples of this approach include Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Christiano et al. (2004),
and Altig et al. (2004).
17For recent examples of full-information estimation, see Schorfheide (2000), Smets and Wouters (2003),
and Onatski and Williams (2004).
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4.2 Detailsof the Es timation Procedure
We begin by using ordinary least-squares to estimate an unconstrained VAR involving the
inﬂation gap, the markup gap, and the output gap. We then proceed to use this model
as a benchmark for conducting indirect inference on the structural model, which consists
of the generalized price-setting framework combined with the markup gap and output gap
equations taken from the unconstrained VAR.18 In our empirical analysis, the optimal price-
setting equation includes an exogenous white-noise disturbance that may reﬂect shifts in
sales tax rates or stochastic variation in the desired markup.19
For a sample of length T, the vector of parameter estimates of the unconstrained VAR
is denoted by ˆ ζT, while the estimated covariance matrix of these parameters is denoted by
ˆ ΣT(ˆ ζT). It should be noted that the vector ˆ ζT includes not only the VAR coeﬃcients but also
the variances and contemporaneous correlations of the innovations. The unconstrained VAR
is speciﬁed with three lags of each variable; this speciﬁcation yields serially uncorrelated
residuals (based on the Ljung-Box Q(12) statistic) and corresponds to the reduced-form
VAR representation of the structural model when price contracts have a maximum duration
of four quarters.
The vector of structural parameters, θ, includes the distribution of contract durations
(ωj for j =1 ,...,4), the sensitivity of new contracts to aggregate real marginal cost (γ), and
the standard deviation of the white-noise disturbance to the optimal price-setting equation
(σε). The distribution of contract durations is estimated subject to the constraint that these
parameters are non-negative and sum to unity. Finally, rather than estimating the discount
factor, we simply calibrate β =0 .9925, corresponding to an annualized steady-state real
interest rate of about 3 percent.
For any particular vector of structural parameters θ, we conﬁrm that the model has a
unique linear rational expectations solution and then obtain its reduced-form VAR repre-
18Of course, when the output gap is used as the proxy for real marginal cost, the unconstrained model is
simply a bivariate VAR involving the inﬂation gap and the output gap, and the structural model consists of
the generalized price-setting framework and the output gap equation from the unconstrained VAR.
19See Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003).
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model, we generate “artiﬁcial” time series of length S for the endogenous variables, namely,
the relative contract prices, the inﬂation gap, the markup gap, and the output gap.20 We
then ﬁt the latter three randomly-generated series with an unconstrained VAR model that
is isomorphic to the one applied to the observed data. The vector of ﬁtted VAR parameters
is denoted by ˆ ζS(θ) because these VAR parameters depend on the particular values of the
structural parameters θ as well as the restrictions of the structural model and the sample
size S of the simulated data.
We then use a numerical optimization algorithm to determine the set of structural
parameters that maximizes the ﬁt between the simulation-based VAR parameters and those
of the unconstrained VAR of the observed data. In particular, the estimated value of θ
minimizes the following criterion function:
QS,T(θ)=
 








ˆ ζT − ˆ ζS(θ)
 
, (13)
where S is the matrix of zeros and ones that selects the elements of ˆ ζT that correspond to
the inﬂation equation of the unconstrained VAR.21
Because this criterion function employs the optimal weighting matrix, the resulting
estimator of θ is asymptotically eﬃcient. In particular, under certain regularity conditions
(including the assumption that the sample size ratio S/T converges to a constant q as
T →∞ ), this estimator is consistent and has the following asymptotic normal distribution:
√
T (ˆ θS,T − θ0)
d −→ N[0,(1+ q−1)(Z  S   
S Σ(ζ0)S   −1 SZ)−1], (14)
where θ0 is the probability limit of ˆ θS,T; ζ0 is the plim of ˆ ζT;Σ ( ζ0) is the plim of ˆ ΣT(ˆ ζT);
z(θ0) is the plim of ˆ ζS(θ0)a sS →∞ ; and Z =( ∂z(θ0)/∂θ ).
20To simulate the model, we employ a Gaussian random-number generator for the disturbances, and we
use steady-state values as initial conditions for the endogenous variables; the ﬁrst few years of simulated
data are excluded from the sample used for indirect inference to ensure that the results are not inﬂuenced
by these particular initial conditions. The eﬀective sample size is S =1 00 T.
21This choice of the selection matrix S is useful for alleviating the computational burden of our estimation
procedure. In principle, all elements of ˆ ζT could be included in the estimation. However, our estimation
results are unlikely to change because the markup gap and output gap equations in our structural model
are taken from the unconstrained VAR itself. The ﬁnding that the autocorrelation functions of the markup
gap and the output gap implied by the estimated structural model are virtually identical to those implied
by the unconstrained VAR is reassuring in this respect.
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By applying the methodology described above, we can now proceed to gauge the degree
of nominal rigidity in terms of the estimated distribution of contract durations. We also
consider evidence on the model’s goodness-of-ﬁt, which conﬁrms that this framework pro-
vides a close match to the dynamics of the data even without more complex propagation
mechanisms such as imperfect information or indexation to lagged inﬂation. Finally, we
document the empirical importance of accounting for the evolution of the Bundesbank’s
medium-term inﬂation objective.
5.1 The Distribution of Price Contract Durations
Table 1 provides results for the distribution of price contract durations when the model
is estimated using the benchmark markup gap and inﬂation gap. For both the random-
duration and ﬁxed-duration speciﬁcations, the estimated distribution of contract durations
corresponds to a relatively moderate degree of nominal rigidity, broadly consistent with
evidence from surveys and micro price records regarding the frequency of price adjustment.
Furthermore, given the precision of these estimates, the null hypothesis of no nominal inertia
(that is, all prices adjusted every period) can be decisively rejected.
For the random-duration speciﬁcation, the estimated distribution of contract durations
is remarkably close to that of a truncated Calvo speciﬁcation with a mean duration of two
quarters. In particular, the truncated Calvo model would imply that 48 percent of contracts
are adjusted each period, while 23 percent are adjusted after two quarters, 11 percent after
three quarters, and the remaining 18 percent are adjusted upon reaching the maximum
contract length of four quarters. Each of these probabilities is within about one standard
deviation of the corresponding estimate reported in the top row of Table 1, and indeed,
formal hypothesis tests do not reject the null hypothesis that the data are consistent with
this truncated Calvo speciﬁcation.
It is interesting to note that the distribution of contract durations is noticeably longer
for the ﬁxed-duration speciﬁcation. In this case, each individual ﬁrm is assumed to know
21
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Distribution of Contract Durations Mean
ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4 Duration
Random-Duration 0.55 0.17 0.06 0.22 1.95
Contracts (0.12) (0.07) (0.04) (0.10) (0.24)
Fixed-Duration 0.33 0.210.1 2 0.34 2.46
Contracts (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.29)
Note: This table reports the estimated distribution of contract durations for each spec-
iﬁcation of the generalized price-setting framework (that is, random or ﬁxed durations),
obtained using the benchmark markup gap and the inﬂation gap. Estimated standard
errors are given in parentheses.
exactly how long its price contract will remain in eﬀect, whereas the random-duration
speciﬁcation assumes that all new price contracts signed each period have the same ex ante
expected duration. Thus, to match the observed sensitivity of aggregate inﬂation to the
one-year-ahead markup gap, the ﬁxed-duration speciﬁcation must incorporate a somewhat
larger share of four-quarter contracts and a correspondingly smaller share of one-quarter
contracts compared with the random-duration speciﬁcation.
Finally, as shown in Table 2, the estimated distribution of contract durations is rela-
tively insensitive to the choice of proxy for real marginal cost. As discussed in Section 3,
these proxies include an alternative markup gap (that is, a measure of the labor share that
omits the imputed labor income of self-employees) as well as linearly-detrended and HP-
ﬁltered measures of the output gap. In all cases, the estimated mean contract duration
remains at about two quarters, and the individual results are quite close to the correspond-
ing benchmark estimates reported in Table 1.
5.2 Consistency with the Data
As discussed earlier, our estimation procedure is aimed at matching the reduced-form impli-
cations of the structural model to those of an unconstrained VAR. Thus, a natural starting
point for evaluating the goodness-of-ﬁt of the structural model is to compare its implied
22
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Distribution of Contract Durations Mean
ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4 Duration
A. Random-Duration Contracts
Alternative 0.54 0.20 0.08 0.18 1.90
Markup Gap (0.14) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.21)
Output Gap 0.49 0.17 0.14 0.21 2.07
(Linear Trend) (0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.23)
Output Gap 0.44 0.16 0.14 0.27 2.25
(HP Trend) (0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.26)
B. Fixed-Duration Contracts
Alternative 0.34 0.24 0.14 0.27 2.35
Markup Gap (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.27)
Output Gap 0.33 0.22 0.210.24 2.36
(Linear Trend) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.26)
Output Gap 0.33 0.23 0.19 0.25 2.37
(HP Trend) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.26)
Note: This table reports the distribution of contract durations for each speciﬁcation
of the generalized price-setting framework (that is, random or ﬁxed durations) using
three alternative proxies for real marginal cost. Estimated standard errors are given in
parentheses.
autocorrelations with the sample autocorrelations of the observed time series.22 We also
check the implied disturbances to the optimal price-setting equation and to the markup gap
and output gap equations whether these disturbances are serially uncorrelated, consistent
with our maintained assumption of white-noise disturbances in the optimal price-setting
equation.
According to both metrics, the generalized price-setting framework performs very well
in ﬁtting the characteristics of the German macroeconomic data. Complete results are
given in Appendix B; here we simply illustrate the general pattern using one particular
speciﬁcation, namely, the random-duration contract model estimated using the benchmark
markup gap as the measure of real marginal cost. As shown in the left panel of Figure 3, the
22See Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and McCallum (2001).
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Note: Solid line with bold dots: Autocorrelation function of inﬂation implied by the estimated random-
duration staggered-contracts speciﬁcation. Solid line: Autocorrelation function implied by the trivariate
VAR(3) model of the inﬂation gap, markup gap, and output gap. Solid bars: Autocorrelation function
of price shocks implied by the estimated random-duration staggered-contracts speciﬁcation. Dotted lines:
Asymptotic conﬁdence bands.
autocorrelogram of inﬂation implied by the structural model is virtually indistinguishable
from that of the observed data and lies well within the asymptotic conﬁdence bands.23
Furthermore, as depicted in the right panel, the contract price shocks exhibit negligible
autocorrelation–a ﬁnding which is conﬁrmed by portmanteau tests for serial correlation.24
A more formal means of evaluating the structural model is to test whether the overiden-
tifying restrictions of the model are consistent with the data. The degrees of freedom of the
overidentiﬁcation test depends on the number of free parameters in the structural model
compared with the unconstrained VAR. When the structural model is estimated using one
of the markup gap series as a proxy for real marginal cost, the model is matched to an
trivariate VAR involving the markup gap, inﬂation gap, and output gap; in this case, the
test of overidentifying restrictions has seven degrees of freedom. When the structural model
23See Coenen (2004) for a detailed discussion of the methodology used in computing the asymptotic
conﬁdence bands for the estimated autocorrelation functions.
24For the ﬁxed-duration contract model a similar characterisation is provided in Appendix Figure B3. As
can be seen by comparing the panels in Figure 3 with those in Appendix Figure B3, the implications of the
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Random-Duration Fixed-Duration
Contracts Contracts
Benchmark Markup Gap 0.39 0.41
Alternative Markup Gap 0.03** 0.03**
Output Gap (Linear Trend) 0.14 0.25
Output Gap (HP Trend) 0.06* 0.19
Note: This table indicates the probability that the overidentifying restrictions are con-
sistent with each speciﬁcation of the generalized price-setting framework for each of the
four diﬀerent proxies for real marginal cost. A single asterisk indicates rejection at the
90% conﬁdence level, while two asterisks denote rejection at the 95% conﬁdence level.
is estimated using the output gap as the proxy for real marginal cost, then the correspond-
ing unconstrained model is a bivariate VAR involving the inﬂation gap and the output gap,
and the overidentiﬁcation test has three degrees of freedom.
As shown in Table 3, when the model is estimated using either the benchmark markup
gap or the linearly-detrended output gap, the overidentifying restrictions are not rejected
at the 95 percent conﬁdence level for either the random-duration or ﬁxed-duration versions
of the model. Evidently, these results are not simply due to lack of statistical power: the
overidentifying restrictions are rejected at a conﬁdence level exceeding 95 percent when the
uncorrected markup gap is used as the proxy for real marginal cost, and these restrictions
are rejected at nearly the 95 percent conﬁdence level for the random-duration model when
the HP-detrended output gap is used as the proxy variable.
5.3 The Role of the Time-Varying Inﬂation Objective
The generalized price-setting framework is oriented towards explaining short-run inﬂation
dynamics in response to shifts in real marginal cost, treating the central bank’s objective
as ﬁxed and known. For this reason, our discussion thus far has focused on the estimation
results obtained using the “inﬂation gap”; that is, the deviation of actual inﬂation from the
25
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Distribution of Contract Durations Mean
ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4 Duration
Random-Duration 0.42 0.02 0.06 0.512.66
Contracts (0.10) (0.03) (0.05) (0.13) (0.40)
Fixed-Duration 0.17 0 0.08 0.75 3.40
Contracts (0.05) — (0.06) (0.17) (0.56)
Note: This table reports the parameter estimates for each speciﬁcation of the generalized
price-setting framework (that is, random or ﬁxed contract duration) when the model is
estimated using the level of inﬂation and the speciﬁed proxy for real marginal cost over
the period 1974-1998. Estimated standard errors are given in parentheses.
Bundesbank’s medium-term inﬂation objective.25 Now we brieﬂy turn to the implications
of ignoring time-variation in the inﬂation objective–an approach which characterizes much
of the empirical NKPC literature.
Table 4 reports the contract distribution and real rigidity parameters obtained when
the price-setting framework is estimated using the level of inﬂation rather than the inﬂation
gap.26 Evidently, the mean duration of price contracts is noticeably longer–close to three
quarters for the random-duration model, and a bit longer for the ﬁxed-duration model. Fur-
thermore, the restrictions implied by a truncated Calvo distribution can be clearly rejected
in either case, because the estimated distribution involves a relatively large number of one
and four quarter contract durations with relatively few 2-3 quarter contracts.
Nevertheless, our model diagnostics indicate that this speciﬁcation falls short of a satis-
factory match with the observed data. In particular, while the left panel of Figure 4 shows
that the inﬂation autocorrelations implied by the model match those of the data, the right
panel reveals that the autocorrelogram of the price contract shocks looks unreasonable in
this case, especially the highly signiﬁcant degree of fourth-order serial correlation. Thus, we
conclude that accounting for time-variation in the Bundesbank’s implicit inﬂation objective
during the period 1975-84 is important in obtaining accurate estimation results.
25We have obtained broadly similar results using an inﬂation gap series constructed via quadratic detrend-
ing, with the one notable diﬀerence being a somewhat shorter estimated mean duration for each contracting
speciﬁcation.
26For the ﬁxed-duration speciﬁcation, the estimation procedure hits the non-negativity constraint on ω2;
thus, the results are reported under the restriction that ω2 =0.
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Note: Solid line with bold dots: Autocorrelation function of inﬂation implied by the estimated random-
duration staggered-contracts speciﬁcation. Solid line: Autocorrelation function implied by the trivariate
VAR(3) model of inﬂation, the markup gap, and the output gap. Solid bars: Autocorrelation function
of price shocks implied by the estimated random-duration staggered-contracts speciﬁcation. Dotted lines:
Asymptotic conﬁdence bands.
6 Interpreting the Degree of Real Rigidity
While our generalized price-setting framework directly identiﬁes the distribution of nominal
contract durations, the degree of real rigidity is summarized by a single composite param-
eter, γ. We now consider the implications of the estimated value of γ—corresponding to
a relatively high degree of real rigidity—in terms of the underlying structural parameters
of the ﬁrm’s production and demand functions. Finally, we analyze a small Monte Carlo
simulation experiment intended to gauge the magnitude of downward bias in γ that might
be attributed to persistent mismeasurement of real marginal cost.
6.1 The Estimated Degree of Real Rigidity
In evaluating the degree of real rigidity, the model with no ﬁrm-speciﬁc inputs and a constant
elasticity of demand provides a natural benchmark, because in this case γ = γd = γmc =1;
that is, a one percent increase in real marginal cost causes a one percent rise in the level of
new price contracts. In contrast, Table 5 indicates that new price contracts exhibit much
27
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Markup Gap (0.0035) (0.0022)
Alternative 0.0078 0.0039
Markup Gap (0.0028) (0.0013)
Output Gap 0.0064 0.0032
(Linear Trend) (0.0016) (0.0008)
Output Gap 0.0280 0.0145
(HP Trend) (0.0035) (0.0023)
Note: For each speciﬁcation of the generalized price-setting framework (that
is, random or ﬁxed durations), this table reports the estimated real rigidity
parameter (γ) obtained using the inﬂation gap and the speciﬁed proxy for real
marginal cost. Estimated standard errors are given in parentheses.
lower sensitivity to real marginal cost. For example, γ is only about 0.027 for the random-
duration speciﬁcation estimated using the benchmark markup gap.27 Furthermore, equation
(8) suggests that both ﬁrm-speciﬁc inputs and strong curvature of the demand function are
needed to generate the estimated degree of real rigidity.
6.2 Structural Interpretation of the Estimates
As indicated in Section 2, the sensitivity of new price contracts to aggregate marginal
cost (γ) depends on the share parameter (α), the steady-state demand elasticity (η), and
the relative slope of the demand elasticity at steady state ( ). Thus, we now investigate how
the implied degree of real rigidity varies with each of these underlying structural parameters.
To explore the role of ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed factors, we consider two distinct values for
the share parameter α. With the fairly standard calibration of α =0 .3, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
ﬁxed factor (capital) accounts for 30 percent of total cost while the variable input (labor)
accounts for 70 percent of total cost. The alternative calibration α =0 .6 may be interpreted
27It should be noted that the estimated degree of real rigidity is slightly higher if one ignores time-variation
in the inﬂation objective(cf. Section 5.3). For example, estimating the model using inﬂation in levels together
with the benchmark measure of marginal cost yields ˆ γ =0 .0413 for the random-duration speciﬁcation and
0.0319 for the ﬁxed-duration speciﬁcation, with estimated standard errors of 0.0042 and 0.0037, respectively.
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realistically) the extent to which a substantial fraction of the labor input should also be
viewed as a ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed factor.
Reﬂecting the degree of empirical controversy regarding the steady-state demand elas-
ticity, we consider values of η ranging from 5 to 20. Since the steady-state markup rate is
equal to η/(η − 1), the bottom of this range corresponds to a steady-state markup rate of
25 percent, while the top of the range implies a 5 percent markup rate. With an even more
severe paucity of evidence about the value of  , we examine three distinct speciﬁcations for
this parameter:   = 0, corresponding to the Dixit-Stiglitz speciﬁcation of constant demand
elasticity;   = 10, consistent with results obtained by Bergin and Feenstra (2000); and
  = 33, the benchmark value of Kimball (1995) and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000).
Each panel of Figure 5 depicts the implied value of γ for alternative values of η and   for
a particular value of the share parameter α. For ease of reference, the ﬁgure also indicates
the estimated value of ˆ γ =0 .027 and the corresponding 95 percent conﬁdence interval that
we obtained for the random-duration contract model using the benchmark labor share as
the proxy for real marginal cost.
When ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed inputs account for 30 percent of total cost (α =0 .3), no plausi-
ble combination of values of η and   can account for the estimated value of γ. For example,
with a constant demand elasticity and a steady-state markup rate of 10 percent (that is,
  = 0 and η = 11), the implied value of γ is about 0.12. Even with very strong curvature
of the demand function (  = 33), the implied value of γ is several times larger than the
benchmark estimate ˆ γ.
In contrast, when ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors account for 60 percent of total cost (α =0 .6),
the model-implied value of γ lies within the 95 percent conﬁdence interval whenever the
steady-state demand elasticity is suﬃciently high. For example, with a constant demand
elasticity (  = 0), the value of γ =0 .03 is obtained for η = 16, corresponding to a steady-
state markup rate of about 6 percent. Furthermore, the speciﬁc value of   is relatively
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A. 30 Percent Cost Share of Firm-Speciﬁc Inputs
Implied γ










Steady-State Demand Elasticity (η)
B. 60 Percent Cost Share of Firm-Speciﬁc Inputs
Implied γ










Steady-State Demand Elasticity (η)
Note: Each panel indicates the implied degree of real rigidity (γ) corresponding to alternative combinations
of the steady-state demand elasticity (η) and the curvature of demand ( ); the upper panel depicts these
results for α =0 .3, while the lower panel gives corresponding results for α =0 .6. The horizontal line
at ˆ γ =0 .027 indicates the parameter estimate obtained for the random-duration contract model using
the benchmark labor share as the measure of real marginal cost, while the dotted lines denote the 95%
conﬁdence bands associated with this estimate.
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Although our empirical results are reasonably robust to the choice of proxy for real marginal
cost (e.g., the labor share or the output gap), it is important to recognize that each of these
variables is likely to involve fairly large and persistent measurement errors. Thus, before
drawing deﬁnitive conclusions about the likely combination of underlying structural param-
eters, it is important to gauge the extent to which the estimated real rigidity parameter
may exhibit downward bias due to the mismeasurement of real marginal cost.
To investigate this issue, we have conducted a small Monte Carlo simulation experiment
for each speciﬁcation of the generalized contracting framework (that is, either random or
ﬁxed-duration contracts). First, we assume that the parameter estimates obtained using
the benchmark labor share are those of the “true” model of the economy, and proceed
to generate 500 artiﬁcial datasets from this model; each artiﬁcial dataset has the same
time dimension T as that of the actual data described in Section 3. For each artiﬁcial
dataset, we construct an “observed” proxy variable by adding measurement errors to the
“true” series for real marginal cost; these measurement errors follow an AR(1) process with
persistence parameter ρm, while the innovations have an i.i.d. Gaussian distribution with
a standard deviation which is calibrated such that the unconditional standard deviation
of the measurement error is equal to 1percent, regardless of the value of the persistence
parameter ρm. For each artiﬁcial dataset, we then use the “observed” data to estimate
the structural model, employing the indirect inference procedure described in Section 4.
Finally, we compute the mean estimate of γ, averaging across all artiﬁcial datasets, and
then determine the relative degree of bias by calculating the percent diﬀerence between this
mean estimate and the “true” value of γ.
As indicated in Table 6, mismeasurement of real marginal cost may indeed induce a non-
trivial degree of downward bias in estimating the real rigidity parameter, especially when
the measurement errors exhibit substantial persistence. For example, when ρm =0 .95, the
estimated value of γ is biased downward by about 30 percent for both the random-duration
and ﬁxed-duration speciﬁcations of the model.
These results are reasonably reasurring, because raising the estimated value of γ by 30
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Relative Bias of ˆ γ (in percent)
Persistence of Random-Duration Fixed-Duration
Measurement Errors Contracts Contracts
ρm = 0 -3.9 -4.0
ρm =0 .5 -12.9 -13.1
ρm =0 .75 -24.5 -23.1
ρm =0 .95 -31.1 -31.1
Note: For each speciﬁcation of the generalized price-setting framework, this
table reports the results of a Monte Carlo simulation experiment to determine
the relative bias (in percent) in estimating the real rigidity parameter (γ) under
alternative assumptions about the persistence of the measurement errors (ρm).
percent (or even 50 percent) continues to imply a very high degree of real rigidity, consistent
with a relatively high steady-state demand elasticity and a substantial role for ﬁrm-speciﬁc
ﬁxed inputs. Of course, these results also underscore the need for further work in ﬁnding
better proxies for real marginal cost, or alternatively, identifying instrumental variables
that are orthogonal to the measurement errors that are likely to be present in the observed
series.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have formulated a generalized price-setting framework that incorporates
staggered contracts of multiple durations and that directly identiﬁes the inﬂuences of nom-
inal vs. real rigidities. Using German macroeconomic data over the period 1975Q1 through
1998Q4 to estimate this framework, we ﬁnd that the data is well-characterized by a trun-
cated Calvo-style distribution with an average duration of about two quarters and by a
relatively high degree of real rigidity. Finally, our results indicate that backward-looking
behavior is not needed to explain the aggregate data, at least in an environment with a
stable monetary policy regime and a transparent and credible inﬂation objective.
This paper has proceeded under the assumption that all ﬁrms face the same output
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November 2004elasticity of marginal cost. In subsequent work, it will be interesting to explore whether this
parameter varies systematically across groups of ﬁrms with diﬀerent contract durations; that
is, whether the aggregate data imply a cross-sectional relationship between nominal and real
rigidities. Furthermore, the approach used here can easily be applied to other economies,
especially for sample periods over which the inﬂation objective has been reasonably stable
or has evolved gradually in a transparent way. Finally, our approach can be extended to
consider the joint determination of aggregate wages and prices, in a framework that allows
for multiple-period durations of both types of contracts.
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This appendix considers a simpliﬁed version of the generalized price-setting framework for
purposes of comparison with some earlier literature. In particular, in the case of ﬁxed-
duration contracts, the average new contract price ¯ xt is given by
¯ xt =E t
  J−1  
i=1












and ¯ Φi =
 J−1
k=i ¯ φk.
As in Taylor (1993) and Guerrieri (2002), we consider the approximation obtained by
assuming negligible variation across new price contracts of diﬀerent durations; that is,
xj,t ≈ ¯ xt. In this case, log-linearization around the zero steady-state inﬂation rate yields
the following expression for the aggregate price identity:
J−1  
i=0




where ¯ ψi =
 J
j=i+1 (ωj/j) and ¯ Ψi =
 J−1
k=i ¯ ψk.
Thus, using this approximation, the weights in the aggregate identity are identical to
those in the price-setting equation, just as in the case of random-duration contracts. Fur-
thermore, in the special case of no discounting (β = 1), the simpliﬁed ﬁxed-duration contract
speciﬁcation is observationally equivalent to the random-duration speciﬁcation.
Evidently, as shown in Table A1the simpliﬁed ﬁxed-duration contract speciﬁcation
implies somewhat longer average duration compared with the generalized ﬁxed-duration or
random-duration speciﬁcations considered above.
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Distribution of Contract Durations Mean Real
ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4 Duration Rigidity (γ)
A. Inﬂation Gap
Benchmark 0.28 0.18 0.09 0.45 2.72 0.0263
Markup Gap (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.15) (0.44) (0.0035)
Alternative 0.22 0.14 0.13 0.51 2.94 0.0069
Markup Gap (0.08) (0.03) (0.02) (0.09) (0.34) (0.0026)
Output Gap 0.24 0.16 0.20 0.40 2.77 0.0062
(Linear Trend) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10) (0.13) (0.32) (0.0014)
Output Gap 0.19 0.14 0.18 0.48 2.96 0.0276
(HP Trend) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.16) (0.45) (0.0035)
B. Inﬂation in Levels
Benchmark 0.16 0.01 0.06 0.77 3.44 0.0410
Markup Gap (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.19) (0.65) (0.0042)
Output Gap 0.14 0 0.12 0.74 3.47 0.0112
(Linear Trend) (0.05) — (0.05) (0.25) (0.84) (0.0023)
Note: For each measure of real marginal cost, this table reports the estimated parameters of the price-
setting framework with ﬁxed-duration contracts, using the simplifying assumption of negligible variation
across new price contracts of diﬀerent durations. Estimated standard errors are given in parentheses.
When the estimation procedure hits the non-negativity constraint on ω2, the results are reported under
the restriction that ω2 =0.
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This appendix provides further details regarding the estimation results.
Appendix Table B1: Estimated Standard Deviation of Contract Price Shocks
Random-Duration Fixed-Duration Simpliﬁed
Contracts Contracts Fixed-Duration
A. Estimated using Inﬂation Gap
Benchmark 0.0035 0.0030 0.0035
Markup Gap (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006)
Alternative 0.0032 0.0027 0.0040
Markup Gap (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Output Gap 0.0038 0.0029 0.0038
(Linear Trend) (0.0005) (0.004) (0.0006)
Output Gap) 0.0043 0.0029 0.0043
(HP Trend) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006)
B. Estimated using Level of Inﬂation
Benchmark 0.0053 0.00510.0053
Markup Gap (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Output Gap 0.0055 0.0049 0.0055
(Linear Trend) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Note: This table indicates the estimated standard deviation of the contract price shock
for alternative speciﬁcations of the generalized price-setting framework. For each marginal
cost proxy variable, Panel A shows results when the model is estimated using the inﬂation
gap (which incorporates the Bundesbank’s medium-term inﬂation objective), while Panel B
provides results when the model is estimated using inﬂation in levels (corresponding to the
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Random-Duration Fixed-Duration Simpliﬁed
Contracts Contracts Fixed-Duration
A. Estimated using Inﬂation Gap
Benchmark Markup Gap 0.39 0.410.39
Alternative Markup Gap 0.03** 0.03** 0.01**
Output Gap (Linear Trend) 0.14 0.25 0.14
Output Gap (HP Trend)) 0.06* 0.19 0.06*
B. Estimated using Level of Inﬂation
Benchmark Markup Gap 0.49 0.47 0.46
Output Gap (Linear Trend) 0.25 0.29 0.29
Note: This table indicates the probability that the overidentifying restrictions are consistent with each
speciﬁcation of the generalized price-setting framework for each marginal cost proxy variable. The test
statistic has 7 degrees of freedom for each of the markup gap measures, and 3 degrees of freedom for each
of the output gap measures, except that the test has an additional degree of freedom when the estimation
procedure hits the non-negativity constraint on ω2 (due to the extra restriction that ω2 = 0). The inclusion
of one or two asterisks denotes rejection at the 90% or 95% conﬁdence level, respectively.
Appendix Table B3: Ignoring Time-Variation in the Inﬂation Objective
(Results using Linearly-Detrended Output Gap)
Distribution of Contract Durations Mean Real
ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4 Duration Rigidity (γ)
Random-Duration 0.38 0 0.11 0.51 2.76 0.0113
Contracts (0.06) — (0.06) (0.15) (0.45) (0.0027)
Fixed-Duration 0.18 0.05 0.16 0.61 3.19 0.0082
Contracts (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.16) (0.49) (0.0019)
Note: This table reports the parameter estimates for each speciﬁcation of the generalized price-setting
framework (that is, random or ﬁxed contract duration) when the model is estimated using the level of
inﬂation and the speciﬁed proxy for real marginal cost over the period 1974-1998. Estimated standard
errors are given in parentheses. When the estimation procedure hits the non-negativity constraint on ω2,
the results are reported under the restriction that ω2 =0.
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corr. impl. by random−duration contracts
corr. of the unconstr. VAR model
asympt. 90% confidence bands
























































Note: This ﬁgure depicts results for the random-duration contract model estimated using the benchmark
markup gap. Solid lines with bold dots denote the autocorrelation functions implied by the estimated
model. Plain solid lines denote the autocorrelation functions implied by the unconstrained trivariate
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November 2004Appendix Figure B2: Autocorrelations of the Implied Structural Disturbances




Price Shock, Lagged Price Shock
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corr. impl. by random−duration contracts
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Price Shock, Lagged Output Shock
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Markup Shock, Lagged Price Shock
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Markup Shock, Lagged Markup Shock
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Markup Shock, Lagged Output Shock
Lag




Output Shock, Lagged Price Shock
Lag




Output Shock, Lagged Markup Shock
Lag




Output Shock, Lagged Output  
Lag
Note: This ﬁgure depicts results for the random-duration contract model estimated using the benchmark
markup gap. Solid bars denote the autocorrelation functions of the implied disturbances to the optimal
price-setting equation and to the markup gap and output gap equations; the dotted lines denote the
asymptotic 95 percent conﬁdence bands.
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November 2004Appendix Figure B3: Inﬂation Dynamics and Correlations
of Price Shocks Implied by Fixed-Duration Contracts







autocorrelations implied by fixed−duration contracts
autocorrelations of the unconstrained VAR model
asymptotic 90% confidence bands






Price Shock, Lagged Price Shock
Lag
autocorrelations implied by fixed−duration contracts
asymptotic 95% confidence bands
Note: Solid line with bold dots: Autocorrelation function of inﬂation implied by the estimated ﬁxed-
duration staggered-contracts speciﬁcation. Solid line: Autocorrelation function implied by the trivariate
VAR(3) model of the inﬂation gap, markup gap, and output gap. Solid bars: Autocorrelation function
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